diff options
| author | Marvin W <git@larma.de> | 2026-10-04 14:42:16 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Marvin W <git@larma.de> | 2026-10-23 16:59:59 +0200 |
| commit | dba577f39c489b9db29960f2bf5cc78ac4f29d7b (patch) | |
| tree | a8354c9fc328c1442d5e8c5c2adec4b428c92f44 /libdino/src/crypto/openssl/omemo.c | |
| parent | 2413442905e31f34cb0f77c9167003b3725760fe (diff) | |
Move OMEMO, OpenPGP and RTP plugins into main/libdino
Diffstat (limited to 'libdino/src/crypto/openssl/omemo.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | libdino/src/crypto/openssl/omemo.c | 313 |
1 files changed, 313 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/libdino/src/crypto/openssl/omemo.c b/libdino/src/crypto/openssl/omemo.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0912c172 --- /dev/null +++ b/libdino/src/crypto/openssl/omemo.c @@ -0,0 +1,313 @@ +#include "../omemo/helper.h" +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/rand.h> + +int signal_vala_random_generator(uint8_t *data, size_t len, void *user_data) { + return RAND_bytes(data, len) == 1 ? SG_SUCCESS : SG_ERR_UNKNOWN; +} + +struct SIGNAL_VALA_HMAC_CTX { + EVP_PKEY *pkey; + EVP_MD_CTX *ctx; +}; + +int signal_vala_hmac_sha256_init(void **hmac_context, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, void *user_data) { + EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, key, key_len); + if (!pkey) { + return SG_ERR_NOMEM; + } + EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (!ctx) { + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + return SG_ERR_NOMEM; + } + if (EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) != 1) { + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + return SG_ERR_UNKNOWN; + } + + struct SIGNAL_VALA_HMAC_CTX *hmac_ctx = malloc(sizeof(*hmac_ctx)); + hmac_ctx->pkey = pkey; + hmac_ctx->ctx = ctx; + *hmac_context = hmac_ctx; + + return SG_SUCCESS; +} + +int signal_vala_hmac_sha256_update(void *hmac_context, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len, void *user_data) { + struct SIGNAL_VALA_HMAC_CTX *hmac_ctx = hmac_context; + if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(hmac_ctx->ctx, data, data_len) != 1) { + return SG_ERR_UNKNOWN; + } + return SG_SUCCESS; +} + +int signal_vala_hmac_sha256_final(void *hmac_context, signal_buffer **output, void *user_data) { + size_t len; + struct SIGNAL_VALA_HMAC_CTX *hmac_ctx = hmac_context; + if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(hmac_ctx->ctx, NULL, &len) != 1) { + return SG_ERR_UNKNOWN; + } + signal_buffer *output_buffer = signal_buffer_alloc(len); + if (!output_buffer) { + return SG_ERR_NOMEM; + } + size_t another_len = len; + if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(hmac_ctx->ctx, signal_buffer_data(output_buffer), &another_len) != 1) { + signal_buffer_free(output_buffer); + return SG_ERR_UNKNOWN; + } + if (another_len != len) { + signal_buffer_free(output_buffer); + return SG_ERR_UNKNOWN; + } + *output = output_buffer; + return SG_SUCCESS; +} + +void signal_vala_hmac_sha256_cleanup(void *hmac_context, void *user_data) { + struct SIGNAL_VALA_HMAC_CTX *hmac_ctx = hmac_context; + if (hmac_ctx) { + EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac_ctx->ctx); + EVP_PKEY_free(hmac_ctx->pkey); + free(hmac_ctx); + } +} + +static const EVP_CIPHER *aes_cipher(int cipher, size_t key_len) { + switch (cipher) { + case SG_CIPHER_AES_CBC_PKCS5: + switch (key_len) { + case 16: return EVP_aes_128_cbc(); + case 24: return EVP_aes_192_cbc(); + case 32: return EVP_aes_256_cbc(); + } + break; + case SG_CIPHER_AES_CTR_NOPADDING: + switch (key_len) { + case 16: return EVP_aes_128_ctr(); + case 24: return EVP_aes_192_ctr(); + case 32: return EVP_aes_256_ctr(); + } + break; + case SG_CIPHER_AES_GCM_NOPADDING: + switch (key_len) { + case 16: return EVP_aes_128_gcm(); + case 24: return EVP_aes_192_gcm(); + case 32: return EVP_aes_256_gcm(); + } + break; + + } + return NULL; +} + +int signal_vala_encrypt(signal_buffer **output, + int cipher, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, + const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_len, + const uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_len, + void *user_data) { + int result = 0; + uint8_t *out_buf = NULL; + const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher = aes_cipher(cipher, key_len); + if (!evp_cipher) { + // fprintf(stderr, "invalid AES mode or key size: %zu\n", key_len); + return SG_ERR_INVAL; + } + if (plaintext_len > INT_MAX - EVP_CIPHER_block_size(evp_cipher)) { + // fprintf(stderr, "invalid plaintext length: %zu\n", plaintext_len); + return SG_ERR_UNKNOWN; + } + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + int buf_extra = 0; + + if (cipher == SG_CIPHER_AES_GCM_NOPADDING) { + // In GCM mode we use the last 16 bytes as auth tag + buf_extra += 16; + + if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, evp_cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 1) { + // fprintf(stderr, "cannot initialize cipher\n"); + result = SG_ERR_UNKNOWN; + goto complete; + } + + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, iv_len, NULL) != 1) { + // fprintf(stderr, "cannot set iv size\n"); + result = SG_ERR_UNKNOWN; + goto complete; + } + + if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, iv) != 1) { + // fprintf(stderr, "cannot set key/iv\n"); + result = SG_ERR_UNKNOWN; + goto complete; + } + } else { + // TODO: set ivlen? + if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, evp_cipher, 0, key, iv) != 1) { + // fprintf(stderr, "cannot initialize cipher\n"); + result = SG_ERR_UNKNOWN; + goto complete; + } + } + + if (cipher == SG_CIPHER_AES_CTR_NOPADDING || cipher == SG_CIPHER_AES_GCM_NOPADDING) { + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0) != 1) { + // fprintf(stderr, "cannot set padding\n"); + result = SG_ERR_UNKNOWN; + goto complete; + } + } + + out_buf = malloc(plaintext_len + EVP_CIPHER_block_size(evp_cipher) + buf_extra); + if (!out_buf) { + // fprintf(stderr, "cannot allocate output buffer\n"); + result = SG_ERR_NOMEM; + goto complete; + } + + int out_len = 0; + if (EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out_buf, &out_len, plaintext, plaintext_len) != 1) { + // fprintf(stderr, "cannot encrypt plaintext\n"); + result = SG_ERR_UNKNOWN; + goto complete; + } + + int final_len = 0; + if (EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, out_buf + out_len, &final_len) != 1) { + // fprintf(stderr, "cannot finish encrypting plaintext\n"); + result = SG_ERR_UNKNOWN; + goto complete; + } + + if (cipher == SG_CIPHER_AES_GCM_NOPADDING) { + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, 16, out_buf + out_len + final_len) != 1) { + // fprintf(stderr, "cannot get tag\n"); + result = SG_ERR_UNKNOWN; + goto complete; + } + } + + *output = signal_buffer_create(out_buf, out_len + final_len + buf_extra); + +complete: + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + if (out_buf) { + free(out_buf); + } + return result; +} + +int signal_vala_decrypt(signal_buffer **output, + int cipher, + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, + const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_len, + const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_len, + void *user_data) { + int result = 0; + uint8_t *out_buf = NULL; + const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher = aes_cipher(cipher, key_len); + if (!evp_cipher) { + // fprintf(stderr, "invalid AES mode or key size: %zu\n", key_len); + return SG_ERR_INVAL; + } + if (ciphertext_len > INT_MAX - EVP_CIPHER_block_size(evp_cipher)) { + // fprintf(stderr, "invalid ciphertext length: %zu\n", ciphertext_len); + return SG_ERR_UNKNOWN; + } + + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + + if (cipher == SG_CIPHER_AES_GCM_NOPADDING) { + // In GCM mode we use the last 16 bytes as auth tag + ciphertext_len -= 16; + + if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, evp_cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 1) { + // fprintf(stderr, "cannot initialize cipher\n"); + result = SG_ERR_UNKNOWN; + goto complete; + } + + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, iv_len, NULL) != 1) { + // fprintf(stderr, "cannot set iv size\n"); + result = SG_ERR_UNKNOWN; + goto complete; + } + + if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, iv) != 1) { + // fprintf(stderr, "cannot set key/iv\n"); + result = SG_ERR_UNKNOWN; + goto complete; + } + } else { + // TODO: set ivlen? + if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, evp_cipher, 0, key, iv) != 1) { + // fprintf(stderr, "cannot initialize cipher\n"); + result = SG_ERR_UNKNOWN; + goto complete; + } + } + + if (cipher == SG_CIPHER_AES_CTR_NOPADDING || cipher == SG_CIPHER_AES_GCM_NOPADDING) { + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0) != 1) { + // fprintf(stderr, "cannot set padding\n"); + result = SG_ERR_UNKNOWN; + goto complete; + } + } + + out_buf = malloc(ciphertext_len + EVP_CIPHER_block_size(evp_cipher)); + if (!out_buf) { + // fprintf(stderr, "cannot allocate output buffer\n"); + result = SG_ERR_NOMEM; + goto complete; + } + + int out_len = 0; + if (EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, out_buf, &out_len, ciphertext, ciphertext_len) != 1) { + // fprintf(stderr, "cannot decrypt ciphertext\n"); + result = SG_ERR_UNKNOWN; + goto complete; + } + + if (cipher == SG_CIPHER_AES_GCM_NOPADDING) { + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, 16, (void *)(ciphertext + ciphertext_len)) != 1) { + // fprintf(stderr, "cannot set tag\n"); + result = SG_ERR_UNKNOWN; + goto complete; + } + } + + int final_len = 0; + if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, out_buf + out_len, &final_len) != 1) { + // fprintf(stderr, "cannot finish decrypting ciphertexts\n"); + result = SG_ERR_UNKNOWN; + goto complete; + } + + *output = signal_buffer_create(out_buf, out_len + final_len); + +complete: + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + if (out_buf) { + free(out_buf); + } + return result; +} + +void setup_signal_vala_crypto_provider(signal_context *context) { + signal_crypto_provider provider = { + .random_func = signal_vala_random_generator, + .hmac_sha256_init_func = signal_vala_hmac_sha256_init, + .hmac_sha256_update_func = signal_vala_hmac_sha256_update, + .hmac_sha256_final_func = signal_vala_hmac_sha256_final, + .hmac_sha256_cleanup_func = signal_vala_hmac_sha256_cleanup, + .encrypt_func = signal_vala_encrypt, + .decrypt_func = signal_vala_decrypt, + .user_data = 0 + }; + + signal_context_set_crypto_provider(context, &provider); +} |
